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The	  Politics	  of	  Reception:	  ‘Made	  in	  China’	  and	  Western	  Critiquei	  
	  
Abstract	  
The	   paper	   explores	   some	  of	   the	   reasons	   for	   the	   apparent	   incommensurability	   of	   interpretative	   attitudes	   in	   the	  
consumption	  of	  Chinese	  media	  products	  in	  the	  West.	  	  It	  also	  addresses	  the	  difficulties	  faced	  by	  existing	  audience	  
theories	   in	   explicating	   cross-­‐cultural	   media	   communication,	   especially	   as	   it	   applies	   to	   the	   cultural	   and	   political	  
divide	  between	  China	  and	  the	  West,	  a	  phrase	  I	  use	  non-­‐reductively	  as	  no	  more	  than	  an	  abbreviation.	  The	  focus	  of	  
‘Politics	   of	   Reception’	   is	   on	   the	   different	   ‘horizons	   of	   expectation’	   that	   inform	   that	   politics.	   I	   do	   so	   by	   a	   cross-­‐
cultural	  analysis	  of	  the	  reception	  of	  such	  ‘soft-­‐power’	  products	  as	  the	  films	  of	  Zhang	  Yimou;	  the	  reception	  in	  the	  
West	  of	  China’s	  Confucius	   Institutes;	  and	  the	  Chinese	   intervention	   in	  the	  Kadeer	   incident	   in	  Australia.	  The	  paper	  
concludes	   with	   a	   theorization	   of	   the	   principles	   that	   inform	   the	   politics	   of	   Chinese	   and	   Western	   critical	   and	  
evaluative	  attitudes.	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The	  way	  China	  is	  represented	  is	  always	  conditioned	  	  
	   	   	   	   	   	   by	  the	  way	  the	  West	  is	  representing	  itself,	  and	  the	  	  
	   	   	   	  two	  representations	  subsequently	  reinforce	  each	  	  
	   	   	   	  other.	  





Cross-­‐cultural	   reception	   is	   a	   complex	  phenomenon	  and	  yet,	   in	   spite	  of	   a	   large	   corpus	  of	   literature	  on	  
mass	  media	  audiences,	  there	  is	  very	  little	  that	  seriously	  addresses	  this	  complexity.	   In	  this	  paper,	   I	  deal	  
with	  cultural	  exchange	  between	  China	  and	  the	  West,	  a	  phrase	   to	  be	  understood	  non-­‐reductively.	   I	  do	  
not	  approach	  my	  topic	  from	  the	  position	  of	  ‘cultural	  essentialism’	  or	  ‘culturalism’.	  Differences	  in	  political	  
systems	  do	  play	  a	  significant	  role	  in	  the	  communication	  between	  China	  and	  the	  West;	  so	  much	  so	  that	  
many	  Chinese	   soft	   power	   products	   are	   viewed	   as	   propaganda	   in	   the	  West	   simply	   because	   they	   issue	  
from	  a	  Communist	  regime.	  What	  I	  wish	  to	  emphasize	  is	  that	  apart	  from	  the	  question	  of	  political	  systems	  
and	  ideologies	  (Imperial	  China,	  China’s	  Republic,	  China	  under	  Mao	  Zedong,	  reform	  era	  Communism,	  or	  a	  
possible	   future	   liberal	   democratic	   Chinese	   society),	   there	   are	   certain	   historical	   strands	   of	   thought	   in	  
Chinese	  culture	  which	  we	  can	  distil	  from	  the	  various	  historical	  forms	  Confucianism	  has	  undergone	  since	  
the	  Analects	  and	  which	  still	  exert	  an	  influence	  on	  Chinese	  society	  today	  and	  which,	  if	  left	  unaddressed,	  
weaken	  our	  cross-­‐cultural	  as	  well	  as	  political	  analysis.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  Since	  the	  ‘politics	  of	  reception’	  highlights	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  cannot	  easily	  separate	  media	  reception	  from	  
politics,	   I	   will	   focus	   initially	   on	   the	   way	   different	   political	   systems	   respond	   to	   cross-­‐cultural	   media	  
products,	  with	  an	  emphasis	  on	  how	  Chinese	  media	  products	  are	  consumed	  in	  the	  West.	   ‘Reception’	   in	  
this	  sense	  is	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  a	  ‘politics	  of	  media	  consumption	  practices’.	  Such	  a	  politics	  is	  likely	  to	  
reflect	   not	   only	   the	   immediacy	   of	   audience	   responses	   to	   foreign	   media	   messages,	   but	   also	   the	  
differences	  between	  the	  political	  and	  cultural	  systems	  from	  which	  those	  responses	  emanate.	  As	  to	  my	  
second	  theme,	  the	  politics	  of	  audience	  research,	  Chinese	  media	  production	  and	  its	  readings	  in	  the	  West	  
highlight	  the	  fact	  that,	  with	  some	  exceptions,	  (Chilton	  2009;	  Hallin	  and	  Mancini	  2003;	  Curran	  and	  Park	  
2000;	  Mughan	  and	  Gunter	  2000)	  the	  bulk	  of	  audience	  research	  is	  only	  marginally	  useful	  since	  it	  primarily	  
addresses	  national,	  domestic	  media	  consumption.	  (Oates	  2008;	  Staiger	  2005;	  Ross	  and	  Nightingale	  2003;	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Gunter	   2000;	  Morley	   1992)	   In	   the	   arena	  of	  media	   reception,	   the	   cross-­‐cultural	   perspective	   is	   a	   game	  
changer.	  Media	  producers	  in	  the	  national	  arena	  are	  able	  to	  steer	  the	  expectations	  of	  their	  audience	  in	  a	  
way	  that	  is	  not	  possible	  across	  cultural	  divides,	  where	  there	  is	  neither	  a	  shared	  history	  of	  values	  nor	  the	  
benefit	  provided	  by	  ratings	  and	  audience	  feedback.	  Cross-­‐cultural	  audience	  expectations	  are	  difficult	  to	  
gauge,	  especially	  across	  the	  divide	  that	  still	  separates	  Western	  societies	  from	  China.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  The	  paper	  makes	   two	  claims.	   (1)	  Whatever	   the	   fine-­‐grain	  differences	  between	  Chinese	  and	  Western	  
cultural	  and	  political	  attitudes,	  there	  is	  still	  a	  deep	  chasm	  separating	  Chinese	  and	  Western	  ‘horizons	  of	  
expectations’	  in	  the	  reception	  of	  cultural	  products.	  (Jauss	  1982:	  44,	  88f.,	  141f.)	  This	  incommensurability	  
is	   likely	   to	   diminish	   in	   the	   future;	   for	   the	   time	   being	   at	   least	   it	   profoundly	   informs	   the	  ways	   China’s	  
media	  products	  are	  viewed	  in	  the	  West.	  In	  light	  of	  this	  incompatibility,	  the	  paper	  analyses	  not	  only	  the	  
exchange	   of	   media	   products	   between	   China	   and	   West,	   but	   also	   the	   motivation	   underlying	   their	  
reception.	   (2)	   The	   bulk	   of	  media	   audience	   research	   is	   ill	   suited	   for	   cross-­‐cultural	   analysis,	   both	   in	   its	  
theoretical	  premises	  and	  research	  methods.	  	  
Chinese	  media	  and	  soft	  power	  products	  
	  
In	  light	  of	  these	  opening	  remarks	  I	  ask,	  What	  is	  Chinese	  soft	  power?	  And	  what	  is	  it	  for?	  According	  to	  
Joseph	  Nye,	  an	  early	  theorist	  of	  the	  concept,	  soft	  power	  is	  the	  ability	  to	  ‘shape	  the	  preferences	  of	  others’	  
by	  means	  of	  presenting	  one’s	  own	  culture	  as	  attractive	  and	  persuasive.	  Soft	  power	  includes	  anything	  
that	  makes	  societies	  ‘want	  what	  you	  want’.	  (Nye	  2004:	  5)	  Soft	  power	  is	  a	  means	  to	  ‘seek	  influence	  
through	  “culture”’.	  (Chua	  2012:	  119)	  As	  such,	  the	  mastery	  of	  soft	  power	  is	  crucial	  to	  the	  CCP’s	  ‘efforts	  to	  
win	  the	  hearts	  and	  minds	  of	  the	  people’.	  (Montogery	  2010:2)	  These	  efforts	  have	  been	  effective	  also	  to	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the	  extent	  that	  they	  have	  captured	  ‘much	  of	  the	  world’s	  attention	  in	  the	  past	  decade’.	  (Keane	  2007:	  34)	  
The	  success	  of	  China’s	  emerging	  ‘soft	  power’	  (ruan	  shili),	  Michael	  Keane	  observes,	  ‘was	  symbolized	  by	  
the	  Beijing	  Olympics	  in	  2008’.	  (Keane	  2011:	  16)	  Yet	  there	  is	  a	  degree	  of	  reticence	  in	  the	  Western	  
reception	  of	  Chinese	  media	  products	  that	  has	  less	  to	  do	  with	  cultural	  Chineseness	  than	  with	  the	  fact	  
that	  the	  soft	  power	  package	  also	  contains	  a	  hefty	  dose	  of	  the	  ideological	  persuasion	  of	  the	  current	  
Chinese	  government.	  Certainly,	  Chinese	  soft	  power	  has	  not	  been	  quite	  as	  effective	  as	  it	  was	  intended	  to	  
be.	  (Huang	  2013)	  
	  
	  	  	  Another	  complicating	   factor	   is	   that	  Chinese	  soft	  power	   is	  as	  much	   ‘inward-­‐looking’	  as	   it	   is	   ‘outward-­‐
looking’.	   (Barr	   2011:	   28;	   35;	   2012:	   82)	   There	   is	   a	  marked	  difference	  between	   its	  domestic	   purpose	   in	  
creating	   a	   positive	   ‘collective	   imagination’	   and	   its	   international	   aim	   of	   ‘branding	   the	   nation’	   globally.	  
How	   to	   reconcile	   these	   goals	   is	   a	   serious	   challenge	   for	   Chinese	   media	   producers.	   At	   home	   Chinese	  
producers	   face	   two	   hurdles,	   official	   support	   and	   censorship.	   This	   affects	   ‘what	   Chinese	   citizens	   can	  
possibly	  consume	  or	  produce	  in	  terms	  of	  information	  online’.	  (Oates	  2008:	  185)	  Challenged	  by	  the	  dual	  
goal	  of	  global	  and	  domestic	   targeting,	   the	  progressive	  wing	  of	   the	  CCP	  has	  realized	  that	  any	  domestic	  
employment	  of	   ‘raw	  power	   inevitably	  harms	  Beijing’s	  own	  efforts	  to	  promote	  a	  peaceful	   image’.	   (Barr	  
2012:	  85;	  83)	  What	  is	  on	  offer	  domestically	  ‘needs	  to	  avoid	  “chaos”	  at	  all	  cost,	  including	  heavy-­‐handed	  
censorship,	   in	   order	   to	   ensure	   …	   social	   stability	   and	   national	   unity’,	   (Sun	   2010:	   66)	   while	   what	   is	  
disseminated	  abroad	  must	  take	  greater	  cognizance	  of	  Western	  audience	  expectations.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  Reception,	   then,	   is	   a	   good	  deal	  more	   complex	  here	   than	   it	   is	   in	  national	  media	   consumption	  where	  
‘those	  with	  control	  of	   the	  means	  of	  production	  run	  cultural	   life’.	   (Staiger	  2005:	  77)	  For	  nowhere	  does	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the	  observation	  that	  processing	  media	  messages	  is	  ‘a	  learned	  cultural	  practice’	  make	  more	  sense	  than	  in	  
the	   soft	  power	  exchange	  between	  China	  and	   the	  West.	   (Brasell	   1992:	  55)	   If	   the	  West	   is	   to	  become	  a	  
more	   competent	   reader	   of	   Chinese	   media	   products,	   it	   needs	   to	   significantly	   expand	   its	   interpretive	  
frame	  of	  reference.	  According	  to	  ‘cultivation	  theory’,	  the	  West	  must	  embrace	  an	  ‘accumulation	  of	  media	  
experience’	  if	  it	  is	  to	  appreciate	  ‘media	  influence’.	  (Staiger	  2005:	  59)	  Such	  an	  ‘accumulation’	  has	  already	  
taken	  place	  to	  a	  certain	  degree	  in	  the	  domain	  of	  the	  reception	  of	  Chinese	  cinema,	  foremost	  through	  the	  
films	  of	  Zhang	  Yimou.	  (Zhang	  2004)	  
	  
	  	  	  While	   Zhang	   Yimou’s	   early	   films	   tended	   to	   be	   banned	   in	   China	   for	   depicting	   the	   nation’s	   poverty,	  
simple	  folks	  and	  the	  immorality	  of	  sex	  scenes,	  they	  were	  received	  enthusiastically	  by	  Western	  audiences.	  
(Dai	  1993)	  Although	  the	  enthusiasm	  was	  initially	  restricted	  to	  an	  elite	  of	  film	  buff’s,	  the	  awards	  his	  films	  
received	  at	  major	   festivals	  quickly	   spread	  Zhang	  Yimou’s	   reputation	  across	   the	  globe.	  However,	  while	  
Western	  audiences	  showered	  the	  Fifth	  Generation	  filmmaker	   from	  China	  with	  such	  accolades	  as	   ‘near	  
perfect’,	  ‘breathtaking’,	  ‘visual	  purity’,	  achieving	  the	  ‘original	  ambition’	  of	  cinema	  as	  ‘a	  visual	  art	  form’,	  
his	  recent	  film	  The	  Flowers	  of	  War	  has	  been	  received	  with	  far	   less	  flattery.	  The	   intriguing	  point	   is	  that	  
while	  Zhang	  Yimou	  was	  honoured	  with	  the	  artistic	  directorship	  of	  the	  2008	  Olympics	  in	  Beijing	  based	  on	  
the	   global	   acceptance	   of	   his	   movies,	   (Kobak	   2010)	   his	   latest	   film,	   equipped	   with	   all	   the	   features	   of	  
Hollywood,	  big	   stars,	   and	  a	  huge	  budget,	  has	   failed	   the	   test	  of	  Western	  audience	  expectations,	  being	  
reviewed	  as	  ‘a	  crude	  mix	  of	  commercial	  vulgarity	  and	  political	  propaganda’.	  (The	  Guardian)	  This	  stands	  
in	  strong	  contrast	  with	  China’s	  expectations	  for	  the	  film	  to	  at	  least	  being	  short-­‐listed	  as	  ‘best	  foreign	  film’	  





	  	  	  Another	   Chinese	   soft	   power	   product	   that	   has	   had	   a	  mixed	   reception	   in	   the	  West	   are	   the	  Confucius	  
Institutes.	  Created	  and	  monitored	  by	   the	  Hanban,	  a	  non-­‐profit	  branch	  of	   the	  Ministry	  of	  Education	   in	  
Beijing,	  Confucius	  Institutes	  began	  to	  be	  offered	  to	  Western	  universities	  in	  2002.	  Today	  there	  are	  about	  
369	  such	   Institutes	   in	  over	  100	  countries	  around	   the	  world.	   (Churchman	  2011)	  The	  official	  aim	  of	   the	  
Confucius	   Institutes,	   backed	   up	   by	   Confucius	   Classrooms,	   is	   to	   spread	   Chinese	   good	   will,	   Chinese	  
language	   teaching,	   and	   Chinese	   cultural	   values	   across	   the	   globe.	   To	   achieve	   this	   goal,	   Hanban	   has	  
provided	  logos	  and	  emblems,	  books,	  audio-­‐vidual	  materials,	  on-­‐line	  courses,	  Chinese	  instructors,	  as	  well	  
as	   financial	   incentives.	   Chinese	   authorities	   defend	   the	   establishment	   of	   Confucius	   Institutes	   as	   an	  
equivalent	   of	   the	  Goethe	   Institut,	  Alliance	   Francaise,	   and	   the	  British	   Council.	  Within	   a	   relatively	   short	  
time	   since	   China’s	   educational	   initiative	  was	   greeted	   by	   a	   sizable	   body	   of	   critical	   commentary	   in	   the	  
West.	   (Rudolph	   2012;	   Churchman	   2011;	  May	   2011;	  Meyerson	   2010;	   Ren	   2010;	   Scarlatelli	   2010;	   Starr	  
2009;	  Chey	  2008;	  Maslen	  2007)	  Western	  critics	  point	  out	   that	   there	   is	  no	  government	   interference	   in	  
the	   curriculum	   of	   the	   European	   cultural	   institutions,	   while	   the	   opposite	   appears	   to	   be	   the	   case	   in	  
Confucius	   Institutes.	   Some	   critics	   object	   to	   improper	   influence	   by	   the	   CCP	   over	   academic	   freedom	  
(Schmidt	  2010);	  to	  the	  absence	  of	  any	  discussion	  of	  human	  rights,	  of	  dissidents	  such	  as	  Liu	  Xiaobo	  and	  Ai	  
Weiwei,	   of	   Tibet,	   Xinjiang,	   the	   Tiananmen	   Square	   episode;	   the	   topic	   of	   democracy	   (Ren	   2010;	  Norrie	  
2011;	  Nakagawa	  2011);	  and	  of	  other	  sensitive	  issues.	  Critics	  deplore	  a	  lack	  of	  academic	  freedom	  and	  a	  
certain	  bias	   in	  the	  culture	  classes	  (Patty	  2011);	  the	  possibility	  of	   increasing	  influence	  of	  a	  foreign	  state	  
(Ricking	  2012);	  that	  getting	  grants	  from	  China	  is	  a	  form	  of	  ‘dancing	  with	  the	  devil’	  (Rudolph	  2012);	  and	  
the	   unacceptability	   of	   intellectual	   ‘no-­‐go	   zones’.	   (Redden	   2012)	   Objections	   are	   also	   raised	   against	  
restrictions	   on	   the	   relation	   of	   Confucius	   Institutes	   with	   tertiary	   institutions	   in	   China	   by	   the	   policy	   of	  
‘prescribed	  partnerships’	  and	  attempts	  at	  blocking	  guest	  speakers.	  As	  the	  President	  of	  the	  University	  of	  
Manitoba	   Faculty	   Association	   put	   it,	   ‘it	   is	   inappropriate	   to	   allow	   any	   government,	   either	   foreign	   or	  
domestic,	  control	  over	  a	  university	  classroom	  regardless	  of	  how	  much	  money	  they	  offer’.	  (Redden	  2012)	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In	  short,	  China’s	  Confucius	  Institutes	  have	  raised	  the	  suspicion	  of	  a	  communist	  ‘Trojan	  Horse’.	  (Paradise	  
2009;	  Meyerson	  2010)	  
	  
	  	  	  Not	  all	  countries	  have	  welcomed	  the	  establishment	  of	  Confucius	  Institutes	  and	  Confucius	  Classrooms	  
without	  reservations.	  Japan	  and	  India	  government	  decided	  against	  permitting	  any	  to	  be	  established	  at	  
their	  universities.	  Melbourne	  University	  has	  banished	   its	  Confucius	   Institute	  from	  its	  main	  campus.	  On	  
12	  October	  2011,	  a	  petition	  with	  10,000	  signatures	  was	   tabled	   in	   the	  New	  South	  Wales	  Parliament	   in	  
Australia	  demanding	  the	  scrapping	  of	  the	  ‘Confucius	  Classroom	  Scheme’	  to	  prevent	  foreign	  propaganda	  
from	   being	   disseminated	   in	   the	   Australian	   school	   system.	   Though	   European	   intellectuals	   have	   not	  
reacted	  as	  strongly	  to	  the	   introduction	  of	  Confucius	   Institutes	  at	  their	  universities,	  one	  topic	  has	  been	  
widely	   discussed,	   the	   teaching	   of	   Chinese	   ‘exceptionality’,	   according	   to	   which	   Chinese	   culture	   is	  
naturally	  different	  from	  any	  other.	  What	  the	  Europeans	  object	  to	  is	  the	  assumption	  that	  Europe	  and	  its	  
intellectual	  off-­‐springs	  are	  naturally	  critical.	   Instead,	  they	  insist	  that	  critique	  in	  all	   its	  forms	  has	  been	  a	  
hard-­‐won	  achievement	  since	  the	  Enlightenment,	  prior	   to	  which	  obedience	  to	  authority	  was	  not	  unlike	  
obedience	  in	  the	  Confucian	  and	  Chinese	  communist	  sense.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  In	   the	  diplomatic	  arena,	   soft	  power	  as	  an	   intriguing	  variant	  of	   the	  Chinese	  cultural	   campaign	  can	  be	  
illustrated	   by	   the	   visit	   in	   2009	   of	   the	   exiled	   Uyghur	   Rabiya	   Kadeer	   to	   Australia.	   On	   20	   July	   2009	   the	  
Melbourne	  Film	  Festival	  received	  a	  request	  from	  the	  Chinese	  Embassy	  in	  Canberra,	  asking	  the	  Festival	  to	  
scrap	  an	  Australian	  documentary	  film,	  The	  Ten	  Conditions	  of	  Love.	  They	  also	  asked	  the	  Festival	  not	  to	  let	  
the	  protagonist	  of	  the	  film,	  Rabiya	  Kadeer,	  address	  the	  audience.	  The	  Film	  Festival	  replied	  that	  they	  had	  
no	   grounds	   to	   do	   so.	   Likewise,	   the	   Australian	   government	   resisted	   strong	   pressure	   by	   the	   Chinese	  
government	  not	  to	  issue	  her	  a	  visa.	  To	  make	  matters	  even	  more	  precarious,	  Kadeer	  was	  also	  invited	  to	  
offer	  a	   lecture	  at	   the	  prestigious	  National	  Press	  Club	  on	  11	  August.	   	   From	  China’s	  perspective,	  Rabiya	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Kadeer	  is	  a	  criminal	  who,	  as	  the	  President	  of	  the	  World	  Uyghur	  Congress,	  instigated	  a	  violent	  riot	  on	  5	  
July	   in	  Urumqi,	  causing	  1,680	  to	  be	   injured,	  and	  184	  deaths,	   including	  137	  ethnic	  Han	  Chinese	  and	  46	  
Uyghurs.	  (Covered	  by	  The	  Australian,	  5	  August	  to	  12	  October,	  2009)	  	  	  
	  	  	  Since	  Australia,	  like	  China,	  condemns	  terrorism,	  the	  Chinese	  government	  expected	  strong	  cooperation	  
from	  the	  Australian	  government.	  Nor	  is	  it	  just	  the	  CCP	  and	  the	  Chinese	  government	  that	  view	  the	  matter	  
in	  this	  light.	  Many	  Chinese,	  both	  inside	  and	  outside	  China,	  support	  their	  government’s	  hard	  line	  in	  trying	  
to	   stop	   Kadeer’s	   efforts	   at	   ‘splitting’	   the	   country.	   Reading	   the	  web,	   one	   quickly	   gets	   a	   sense	   of	   Han	  
Chinese	   nationalist	   sentiments.	   In	   Australia,	   the	   Melbourne	   Film	   Festival	   website	   was	   targeted	   by	  
Australian	   Chinese	   trying	   to	   prevent	   on-­‐line	   ticket	   sales	   for	   The	   Ten	   Conditions	   of	   Love.	   Some	  
condemned	  the	  unfair	  coverage	  of	  the	  issue	  by	  the	  Australian	  media.	  (The	  Australian,	  17	  August	  2009)	  
As	   one	   blogger	   writes,	   ‘Whenever	   there	   is	   a	   conflict,	   Western	   reporters	   will	   prefer	   to	   choose	   some	  
selected	   views	   -­‐	   you've	   guessed	   it	   right	   -­‐	   the	   views	   that	   are	   opposed	   to	   China.	  …	   They	  would	   rather	  
prefer	  the	  Asians	  remain	  poor	  and	  under-­‐developed,	  so	  that	  the	  superiority	  of	  Western	  civilization	  can	  
be	  maintained	  in	  the	  region’.	  (Davi	  14	  August,	  2009)	  One	  sarcastic	  comment	  reads,	  ‘I'm	  still	  waiting	  for	  
the	   Aussies	   to	   invite	   the	   Indonesian	   terrorists	   who	   recently	   bombed	   Jakarta	   and	   killed	   Aussies,	   to	  
present	  a	  film	  at	  the	  Melbourne	  International	  Film	  Festival’.	   (Ray	  17	  August	  2009)	   	   It	  would	  seem	  that	  
the	   clash	   of	   representations	   and	   interpretations	   remains	   irreconcilable.	   The	   two	   horizons	   are	  
incommensurate,	  at	  least	  for	  the	  time	  being.	  	  
	  	  	  We	  would	  be	  amiss,	  though,	  if	  we	  were	  to	  read	  the	  three	  cases	  merely	  in	  such	  a	  binary	  fashion.	  For	  the	  
situation	  of	  cross-­‐cultural	  reception	  is	  not	  free	  of	  the	  logic	  of	  trans-­‐national	  politics.	  Viewing	  the	  
contrast	  without	  paying	  attention	  to	  the	  pressure	  exerted	  by	  global	  politics	  on	  the	  Chinese	  government	  
and	  Chinese	  cultural	  sensitivities	  would	  assume	  a	  dubious	  interpretive	  innocence	  on	  the	  part	  of	  the	  
Western	  critic.	  Moreover,	  in	  analysing	  the	  three	  cases	  we	  must	  acknowledge	  the	  fundamental	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asymmetry	  that	  exists	  between	  subjects	  in	  China	  and	  the	  West.	  Ironically,	  it	  is	  the	  relative	  critical	  
freedom	  of	  this	  reader	  which	  may	  be	  viewed	  with	  suspicion	  by	  Chinese	  media	  experts	  as	  part	  of	  the	  
global	  hegemonic	  politics	  which	  post-­‐Enlightenment	  reasoning	  finds	  hard	  to	  eschew.	  In	  this	  light,	  
negative	  Western	  responses	  to	  Zhang	  Yimou’s	  latest	  film	  express	  an	  unfulfilled	  demand	  for	  a	  
revolutionary	  potential	  rarely	  explored	  by	  and	  demanded	  from	  Hollywood.	  Western	  reactions	  to	  
Confucius	  Institutes	  can	  be	  read	  as	  expressing	  a	  fear	  of	  a	  well-­‐guarded	  turf	  suddenly	  threatened	  by	  a	  
serious	  competitor;	  and	  the	  Kadeer	  case	  could	  be	  said	  to	  expose	  a	  contrast	  between	  a	  well-­‐developed	  
degree	  of	  sensitivity	  in	  matters	  of	  freedom	  of	  expression	  and	  a	  not	  so	  well-­‐nourished	  auto-­‐critique	  of	  
the	  shortcomings	  of	  Western	  political,	  economic,	  and	  social	  structures.	  In	  short,	  in	  the	  analysis	  of	  cross-­‐
cultural	  media	  reception,	  the	  Enlightenment	  heritage	  of	  critique	  should	  retain	  a	  certain	  distance	  from	  
the	  dominant	  political	  and	  economic	  structures	  of	  the	  West.	  
	  
The	  Chinese	  soft	  power	  paradox	  	  
In	  several	   speeches	  since	   the	  6th	  Plenary	  Session	  of	   the	  CCP’s	  Central	  Committee	   in	  October	  2011,	  Hu	  
Jintao	  refers	  to	  Western	  media	  imports	  as	  ‘spiritual	  pollution’	  and	  ‘hostile	  forces’	   intent	  on	  weakening	  
China	  by	  ‘Westernizing’	  and	  dividing	  it.	  In	  the	  face	  of	  such	  threats,	  the	  Chinese	  need	  to	  be	  ‘vigilant’	  and	  
strengthen	   China’s	   cultural	   image	   ‘socialist	   core	   value	   system’	   at	   home	   and	   abroad.	   (Hu	   2012)	   Hu’s	  
exhortation	   is	   a	  well-­‐rehearsed	   repetition	  of	   ideas	  expressed	   in	   a	   speech	   in	  2009	  by	   Li	   Changchun,	   in	  
charge	  of	  CCP	  propaganda,	  urging	  Chinese	  media	  to	  ‘go	  global’	  by	  strengthening	  ‘our	  foreign	  language	  
channels,	  expanding	  our	  partnership	  with	  foreign	  television	  organizations’	  so	  that	  ‘our	  images	  and	  voice	  
can	  reach	  thousands	  of	  homes	  in	  all	  parts	  of	  the	  world’.	  (Sun	  2010:	  54f.)	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  Such	  pronouncements	  appear	  to	  be	  aimed	  primarily	  at	  strengthening	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  the	  CCP,	  both	  
domestically	   and	   internationally.	   In	   this	   double-­‐directedness,	   China’s	  patriotism	  crusade	  blurs	   cultural	  
and	  political	  nationalism.	  Not	  surprisingly,	  then,	  the	  call	  to	  soft	  power	  by	  the	  Chinese	  government	  has	  
become	  a	  serious	  topic	   in	  the	  West.	  (Huang	  2013;	  Liu	  2012;	  Chua	  2012;	  Barr	  2012;	  2011;	  Keane	  2013;	  
2011;	   2007;	  Montgomery	   2010;	   Sun	   2010;	  Ding	   2009;	   Li	   2009;	   Suzuki	   2009;	  Hunter	   2009;	   Young	   and	  
Jeong	  2008;	  Guo	  2004)	  The	  Chinese	   leadership	  has	  realized	  that	   ‘the	  total	  strength	  of	  Chinese	  culture	  
and	  its	  global	  influence	  is	  not	  compatible	  with	  China’s	  international	  status’.	  (Hu	  2012)	  So	  it	  makes	  sense	  
to	   boost	   China’s	   global,	   cultural	   influence	   to	   achieve	   a	   ‘competitive	   advantage’.	  Only	   in	   this	  way,	   the	  
Party	  leadership	  believes,	  will	  they	  be	  able	  to	  overcome	  China’s	  ‘third	  affliction’,	  its	  still	  largely	  negative	  
image	  in	  the	  world.	  
	  
	  	  	  What	   has	   not	   escaped	   the	   China	   watchers’	   attention	   is	   the	   somewhat	   paradoxical	   nature	   of	   this	  
‘charm	  offensive’.	  (Kurlantzick	  2007	  passim;	  Barr	  2012:	  81)	  It	  is	  paradoxical	  that	  Confucius,	  rejected	  until	  
recently	  as	   feudal	  anathema,	   is	  now	  being	  reconstituted	   in	  a	  very	  different	   image,	  with	   the	  accent	  on	  
harmony,	  moral	  values,	  and	  peace.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  there	  is	  the	  traditional	  Confucius	  in	  the	  Analects,	  	  
still	  a	  popular	  classic	   in	  China,	  advocating	  a	  steep	  social	  hierarchy	  with	  an	   individual	  prince	  at	  the	  top,	  
ruling	  over	  an	  elite	  of	  gentlemen	  and	  a	  mass	  of	  labouring	  peasants.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand,	  today’s	  China	  is	  
representing	  herself	  to	  the	  world	  as	  an	  egalitarian	  society	  in	  which	  everyone	  is	  able	  to	  participate	  in	  the	  
evolving	  market	  economy	  under	  the	  governance	  of	  a	  political	  collective,	  even	  if	  in	  reality	  such	  a	  picture	  
does	   not	   stand	   up	   to	   scrutiny.	   Certainly,	   the	   new	   Confucian	   fiction	   is	   carefully	   groomed	   to	   optimize	  
current	  Chinese	  soft	  power	  aims.	  The	  return	  to	  Confucius	  symbolizes	  the	  new	  China	  as	  imagined	  by	  the	  
government:	   ‘educated,	  orderly,	  harmonious,	   respectful,	  unified’.	  To	   this	  extent	  at	   least,	   the	  sage	   is	  a	  
perfect	   model	   for	   the	   type	   of	   ‘harmonious’	   society	   the	   Party	   wishes	   to	   project.	   (Barr	   2012:	   91;	   cf.	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Anderson	  2006)	  Yet,	  as	  Liu	  Kang	  has	  argued,	  the	  soft	  power	  campaign	  has	  also	  revealed	  a	  fundamental	  
crisis	  of	  ‘cultural	  identity’	  in	  today’s	  China.	  (Liu	  2012)	  
	  
	  	  	  Paradoxical	  too	  is	  the	  hostility	  of	  the	  Chinese	  leadership	  to	  Western	  and	  especially	  Hollywood	  culture.	  
For	  one,	  this	  opposition	  is	  not	  shared	  by	  the	  population	  at	  large;	  more	  to	  the	  point,	  officially	  sponsored	  
films	  with	  their	  patriotic	  themes	  emulate	  precisely	  a	  kind	  of	  Hollywood	  style	  rejected	  by	  China’s	  leaders	  
in	  Western	  media	  products.	  In	  spite	  of	  years	  of	  political	  guidance	  designed	  to	  immunize	  Chinese	  viewers	  
against	   the	   lure	   of	  Hollywood,	  when	   the	  Western	   blockbusters	  Titanic	  and	  Avatar	  where	   screened	   in	  
China,	   they	   were	   greeted	   with	   embarrassing	   enthusiasm	   by	  millions.	   	   As	   a	   result,	   some	   home	  made	  
competitors,	   such	  as	   the	  bio-­‐drama	  Confucius	   (2010),	  had	   to	  be	   shelved.	   	  However,	   the	  extraordinary	  
quota	  of	  no	  more	  than	  20	  movies	  from	  the	  West	  being	  allowed	  to	  be	  screened	  to	  Chinese	  audiences	  per	  
year	  is	  hardly	  motivated	  by	  the	  fear	  that	  ‘envisaging	  an	  alternative	  world	  might	  produce	  political	  action’.	  
(Staiger	  2005:	  112)	  After	  all,	  the	  quota	  is	  widely	  circumvented	  via	  the	  internet	  and	  other	  legal	  as	  well	  as	  
illegal	   avenues.	   The	   fear	   of	   revolutionary	   potential	   of	   too	   much	   Hollywood	   may	   very	   well	   be	  
overshadowed	   by	   a	   resistance	   to	   ‘cultural	   imperialism’	   (Tomlinson	   1997)	   and	   imperial	   ‘penetration’.	  
(Wang	  2005:	  28)	  Moreover,	  one	  of	  the	  mechanisms	  of	  dealing	  with	  a	  variety	  of	  cultural	   features	  from	  
within	  and	  outside	  of	  China	  is	  their	  hybridization	  into	  a	  ‘cultural	  patchwork’.	  (Tao	  2005:	  69)	  Nevertheless,	  
the	   idea	   of	   revolution	   remains	   a	   topic,	   ‘no	   matter	   how	   hidden	   and	   elusive	   it	   is	   in	   the	   profit-­‐	   and	  
consumption	  driven	  contemporary	  era’.	   (Yang	  2009:	  xv)	  Paradoxical	   too	   is	   that	  Chinese	  producers	  are	  
urged	  to	  make	  their	  products	  attractive	  to	  the	  West	  while	  they	  find	  themselves	  constricted	  by	  the	  State	  
Administration	  of	  Radio,	   Film,	   and	  Television,	  whose	  guidelines	  disapprove	  of	   time	   travel,	  myths,	   and	  




	  	  	  Different	   ‘horizons	   of	   expectations’	   can	   be	   said	   to	   be	   a	   result	   also	   of	   the	   asymmetrical	   relations	  
between	  Chinese	  viewers	  and	  subjects	  in	  liberal	  democracies	  that	  are	  at	  work	  in	  the	  following	  case.	  On	  
23	  July	  2012	  both	  CCTV	  4	  and	  Australia’s	  Channel	  10	  reported	  the	  heaviest	  rainfall	  in	  Beijing	  since	  1961.	  
Whereas	  Channel	  10	  showed	  images	  of	  disrupted	  city	  life,	  CCTV	  4	  chose	  to	  turn	  the	  natural	  disaster	  into	  
a	   story	   of	   ‘good	   people	   and	   good	   deeds’.	   Volunteers	  were	   shown	  driving	   to	   Beijing	   airport	   to	   collect	  
stranded	  passengers.	  Perhaps	  the	  two	  ‘horizons	  of	  expectations’	  remain	  artificially	  incommensurable	  as	  
a	   consequence	   of	   political	   interference.	   Yet,	   political	   steering	   is	   not	   the	   only	   factor	   to	   be	   considered	  
here.	   The	   interpreting	   subjects	   are	   also	   culturally	   constituted	   in	  markedly	   different	  ways.	  On	   the	  one	  
hand,	  we	  have	  an	  audience	   that	  appears	   traditionally	   sceptical,	  even	   if	   thoughtlessly	   so;	  on	   the	  other	  
hand,	  the	  Chinese	  audience	  meets	  official	  messages	  halfway,	  yearning	  as	  they	  do	  for	  the	  rise	  of	  a	  once	  
more	   glorious	   China.	   Cultural	   nationalism	   is	   a	   powerful	   force	   in	   China.	   As	   such,	   the	   ‘horizon	   of	  
expectations’	   is	  by	  no	  means	  a	  self-­‐evident	  concept.	   It	   requires	  historical,	  cultural,	  social,	  and	  political	  
specification.	  
Incommensurable	  approaches	  
Important	   for	   cross-­‐cultural	   media	   consumption	   is	   that	   producers	   are	   themselves	   always	   already	   an	  
audience;	  they	  ‘actively	  imagine	  the	  ways’	  in	  which	  ‘audiences	  will	  respond	  to	  their	  works’.	  (Nightingale	  
2003:	   368f.)	   In	   our	   case,	   the	   West	   to	   be	   persuaded	   has	   not	   been	   imagined	   in	   an	   entirely	   effective	  
manner.	  Otherwise	   it	  would	  be	  difficult	   to	  understand	  why	  Chinese	   cultural	   production	  has	  not	   been	  
more	  readily	  embraced	  in	  the	  West.	  Nightingale’s	  ‘imagined	  audience’	  must	  also	  be	  distinguished	  from	  
the	   measurable,	   empirical	   audiences	   and	   their	   function	   in	   the	   constitution	   of	   cultural	   objects.	   This	  
essential	  distinction	  is	  sometimes	  neglected	  in	  audience	  research,	  as	   in	  Barrie	  Gunter	  observation	  that	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‘reception	  analysis	   is	  effectively	   the	  audience	  research	  arm	  of	  modern	  cultural	  studies,	   rather	   than	  an	  
independent	   tradition’.	   (Gunter	   2000:	   19)	   This	   forgets	   the	   important	   point	   	   of	   reception	   theory	   that	  
complex	   objects	   such	   as	   stories	   are	   not	   empirical	   data	   but	   imagined	   constructs,	   intentional	   objects,	  
requiring	   constitution,	   in	   the	   sense	   of	   ‘fleshing	   out’	   in	   the	   mental,	   discursive	   and	   nonverbal	   acts	   of	  
individuals	  within	  cultural	   frames.	  A	  second	  perspective	   influential	   in	  reception	  theory	   is	  the	  notion	  of	  
‘horizon’	   made	   famous	   by	   Hans-­‐Georg	   Gadamer’s	   ‘fusion	   of	   horizons’,	   an	   approximating	   process	   by	  
which	  the	  culturally	  distant	  texts	  can	  be	  appropriated	  by	  the	  interpreter.	  (Gadamer	  1985:	  273f.;	  337f.)	  
The	  concept	  of	  ‘horizon’	  has	  become	  popular	  also	  in	  the	  wake	  of	  the	  work	  of	  Jauss,	  who	  foregrounds	  the	  
necessary	   interaction	   of	   a	   ‘producing	   subject’	   and	   the	   ‘consuming	   subject’.	   (Jauss	   1982:	   15)	   With	  
reference	  to	  Gadamer	  and	  the	  Analects,	   John	  Makeham	  emphasizes	   the	  hypothetical	  character	  of	  our	  
readings	  as	  a	  result	  of	  our	  inevitable	  involvement	  in	  the	  constitution	  of	  meaning.	  I	  take	  this	  as	  a	  given.	  
What	  I	  want	  to	  rescue	  from	  the	  complex	  relativity	  of	   interpretation	  is	  that	  there	  have	  survived	  certain	  
Confucian	  principles	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  many	  transformations	  of	  the	  Analects,	  such	  as	  the	  summary	  value	  of	  
obedience	   to	   authority	   in	   contemporary	   China	   and	   a	   concomitant	   scepticism	   towards	   critique.	  
(Makeham	   2003:	   12f.	   205)For	   successful	   cross-­‐cultural	   media	   interpretation	   to	   occur,	   at	   least	   three	  
different	  kinds	  of	  comprehension	  appear	  to	  be	  required:	  of	  generic	  norms;	  the	  history	  of	  forms;	  and	  the	  
opposition	   between	   fiction	   and	   social	   reality.	   (Jauss	   1982:	   24;	   1989:	   151ff.)	   In	   cross-­‐cultural	   media	  
consumption,	  this	  translates	  into	  the	  minimal	  triad	  of	  generic	  innovation,	  the	  historical	  intertextuality	  of	  
styles	  of	  production,	  and	  the	  dialectic	  between	  culturally	  distinct	  media	  messages	  and	  the	  interpretation	  
of	  ambient	  social-­‐political	  situations.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  Under	   the	   influence	   of	   the	   Birmingham	   School	   the	   notion	   of	   reception	   has	   shifted	   from	   individual	  
reading	   performance	   to	   reception	   by	   mass	   audiences	   and	   modes	   of	   consumption,	   with	   various	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emphases:	  on	  the	  processes	  of	   ‘encoding/decoding’;	   (Hall	  1980)	  on	  the	  TV	  viewer	  as	  an	  active	  subject	  
and	   the	   limits	   of	   discursive	   control;	   (Ang	   1991)	   on	   the	   ethnography	   of	   consumer	   practices,	   (Moores	  
1995)	   as	   the	   continuum	   from	   ‘impersonation’	   to	   ‘improvisation’,	   (Nightingale	   2003)	   as	   a	   practice	   of	  
contestation	   within	   the	   logic	   of	   capitalist	   postmodernity,	   (Ang	   1996)	   as	   well	   as	   the	   notion	   of	   the	  
‘diffused	   audience’	   with	   a	   sociology	   of	   performance,	   (Abercrombie	   and	   Longhurst	   1998)	   media	   and	  
democracy,	   (Liebes	  and	  Curran	  1998)	  media	   in	  everyday	   life,	   (Alasuutari	   1999)	   the	  message	   cognition	  
process,	  (Wicks	  2000;	  Gunter	  2000)	  the	  politics	  of	  popular	  culture,	  (Ruddock	  2001)	  and	  on	  the	  relation	  
of	   audience	   and	   identity.	   (Gauntlett	   2007)	   	   Useful	   as	   many	   of	   these	   studies	   are	   for	   telling	   us	   about	  
national	  audiences	  and	  their	  subdivisions	  into	  class,	  gender,	  age	  group,	  and	  other	  categories,	  they	  are	  in	  
need	  of	  being	  complemented	  by	  cross-­‐national	  and	  cross-­‐cultural	  perspectives.	  Much	  the	  same	  can	  be	  
said	  of	   ‘reinforcement	  models’,	   ‘power	  models’	   in	   terms	  of	  media	  effects,	   ‘quantification	  models’	  and	  
their	  ‘behavioural’	  relations.	  (Staiger	  2005:	  66)	  Nor	  indeed	  do	  the	  key	  concepts	  of	  audience	  research	  of	  
‘attendance	   (cinema),	  watching	   (television),	   listening	   (radio),	  and	  reading	   (newspaper	  and	  magazines)’	  
satisfactorily	  address	  the	  problematic	  of	  cross-­‐cultural	  reception.	  (Gunter	  2000:	  94)	  	  
	  
	  	  	  From	  the	  cross-­‐cultural	  perspective	  of	  ‘Made	  in	  China’	  in	  the	  West,	  I	  also	  want	  to	  take	  issue	  with	  such	  
influential	  analyses	  as	  those	  by	  Pierre	  Bourdieu	  and	  Michel	  De	  Certeau.	  The	  tendency	  to	  reduce	  cultural	  
dispositions	  to	  socioeconomic	  realities,	  as	  in	  the	  work	  of	  Bourdieu,	  does	  not	  explain	  very	  well	  why	  such	  
deeply	  rooted	  cultural	  dispositions	  as	  Confucian	  obedience	  and	  the	  Chinese	  conception	  of	   language	  as	  
normative	  nominalism	  persist	  stubbornly	  in	  the	  era	  of	  socialist	  market	  capitalism.	  (Bourdieu	  1984:	  288ff.;	  
334ff.;	   391ff.)	   A	   similar	   lack	   of	   explanatory	   force	   can	   be	   observed	   if	   we	   choose	   De	   Certeau’s	   central	  
theses	  in	  The	  Practice	  of	  Everyday	  Life	  to	  interpret	  the	  persistence	  of	  cultural	  attitudes	  in	  contemporary	  
China.	   To	   be	   sure,	   it	   is	   precisely	   local	   and	   individual	   ‘tactics’	   of	   survival	   in	   the	   face	   of	   government	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‘strategies’	   that	   constitute	   a	   popular	   form	   of	   resistance	   to	   dominant	   power.	   (De	   Certeau	   1984)	   Yet	  
neither	   Bourdieu’s	   nor	   De	   Certeau’s	   analyses	   shed	   much	   light	   on	   the	  Western	   reception	   of	   Chinese	  
media	  products.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  In	  describing	  cross-­‐cultural	  audiences,	  we	  must	  account	  for	  ‘the	  social	  world	  of	  actual	  audiences’	  (Ang	  
1991:	   13)	   while	   acknowledging	   that	   no	   audience	   can	   be	   successfully	   described	   as	   ‘external	   to	   its	  
discursive	   construction’.	   (Hartley	   1987:	   125)	   Useful	   pointers	   to	   such	   a	   task	   can	   be	   found	   in	   Shaun	  
Moores’	   Ethnography	   of	   Media	   Consumption.	   If	   the	   central	   aim	   of	   reception	   ethnography	   is	   to	  
understand	   the	   lived	   experience	   of	   media	   consumers,	   then	   it	   has	   to	   engage	   with	   ‘the	   situational	  
contexts	   in	   which	   the	  media	   are	   used	   and	   interpreted’.	   Even	   though	  Moores	   focuses	   on	   the	   ‘micro-­‐
setting’	  of	   an	   ‘anthropology	  of	  everyday	   consumption’,	  we	  can	   translate	   this	   approach	   to	   the	   level	  of	  
cross-­‐cultural	  analysis	  of	  media	  reception	  by	  extending	  it	  to	  the	  ‘macro-­‐setting’	  of	  global	  comparisons.	  
(Moores	   1995:	   32)	  A	   similar	   case	   can	  be	  made	   for	   the	   approach	   employed	  by	  Paul	  Willis	   in	  Common	  
Culture,	  though	  we	  cannot	  simply	  transfer	  his	  assumption	  of	  a	  common	  youth	  culture	   from	  a	  national	  
plane	  to	  that	  of	  the	  cross-­‐cultural	  reception	  of	  media	  products	  being	  exchanged	  between	  China	  and	  the	  
West.	  What	   is	   transferable,	   it	   seems	   to	   me,	   are	   the	   parameters	   of	   the	   consumption	   of	   popular	   art,	  
lifestyles,	  and	  the	  notion	  of	   ‘symbolic	  creativity’.	  That	  Willis’	   idea	  of	  the	  symbolic	  play	   in	  the	  everyday	  
culture	  of	  the	  young	  will	  become	  increasingly	  relevant	  for	  cross-­‐cultural	   interpretation	   is	  borne	  out	  by	  
the	  recent,	  raving	  reception	  of	  Avatar	  in	  China.	  (Willis	  1990)	  
	  
	  	  	  A	  broad	  approach	  to	  international	  cultural	  interaction	  has	  been	  proposed	  by	  Wanning	  Sun	  who	  speaks	  
of	  ‘three	  related	  perceptions	  of	  the	  role	  of	  communication’	  which	  we	  can	  bring	  to	  bear	  on	  the	  question	  
of	  China’s	  soft	  power	  initiatives:	  (1)	  Communication	  as	  ‘a	  form	  of	  symbolic	  power’	  transforming	  global	  
perceptions	  of	  China	   to	  become	  compatible	  with	  China’s	  political	  and	  economic	  goals.	   (2)	   ‘Credibility-­‐
16 
 
gaining	   process’.	   Here,	   the	   emphasis	   is	   on	   merging,	   as	   far	   as	   possible,	   the	   differing	   horizons	   of	  
expectation	  of	  ‘media	  producers	  and	  media	  consumers’.	  (3)	  A	  form	  of	  narrative	  by	  which	  the	  values	  of	  
one	  society	  can	  be	  effectively	  transmitted	  to	  another	  society.	  Together,	  the	  three	  kinds	  of	  perception	  of	  
communication,	   Sun	   argues,	   allow	   us	   to	   better	   understand	   ‘communication	   across	   different	   symbolic	  
universes’.	  (Sun	  2010:	  56f.)	  This	  is	  useful,	  as	  is	  Chua’s	  tripartition	  into	  local,	  diasporic,	  and	  international,	  
culturally	   distant	   audiences,	   each	   with	   its	   concomitant	   ‘field	   of	   analysis’	   and	   investment	   of	   self-­‐
identification.	  (Chua	  2012:	  81f.)	  
	  
	  	  	  From	  whichever	   side	  we	   approach	   cross-­‐cultural	   exchange,	  we	  must	   accept	   that,	   on	   the	   one	   hand,	  
‘every	   culture	   strives	   to	   takes	   steps	   to	  preserve	  and	  promote	   its	  own	  aesthetic	  heritage	  and	  outlook’	  
and,	   on	   the	   other,	   ‘cultural/artistic	   preservation	   becomes	   a	   larger	   issue	   as	   economic	   globalization	  
accelerates’.	   (Orlik	  2009:	  287f.)	  At	   the	  same	  time,	   from	  the	  perspective	  of	   reception,	   in	   ‘cross-­‐cultural	  
communication	  …	   the	  message	   is	   translated	   through	  a	   cultural	   lens	  or	   a	   cultural	   filter’.	   (Moriarty	  and	  
Rohe	   2005:	   123)	   This	   relation	   is	   further	   complicated	   in	   cross-­‐cultural	   interaction	   by	   the	   inevitable	  
intrusion	   of	   political	   considerations,	   and	   this	   is	   nowhere	   more	   obvious	   than	   in	   the	   transmissions	   of	  
cultural	  products	  between	  China	  and	  the	  West.	  It	  would	  seem	  that	  in	  this	  global	  exchange	  culture	  and	  
politics	   are	   problematically	   intertwined,	   a	   relation	   complicated	   by	   the	   Chinese	   government’s	   use	   of	  
culture	  to	  deflect	  international	  criticism.	  If	  this	   is	   indeed	  the	  case,	  a	  broadening	  of	  our	  focus	  on	  media	  
products	   to	   include	   the	   nexus	   between	   culture	   and	   politics	   that	   plays	   a	   role	   in	   the	   deep	   differences	  
between	  China	   and	   the	  West	  may	   provide	   the	   kind	   of	   perspective	   needed	   to	   come	   to	   grips	  with	   the	  




Confucian	  Obedience	  and	  Western	  Critique	  
From	   the	  Enlightenment	   slogan	  of	   ‘everything	  must	   submit	   to	  Kritik’	   to	  present-­‐day	  Critical	  Discourse	  
Analysis	   (CDA),	  the	  hallmark	  of	  European	  thinking	  has	  been	  the	  many-­‐faceted	  notion	  of	  critique.	  (Kant	  
1965:	   9,	   n)	   Since	   its	   inception	  as	   an	  analysis	  of	   ‘the	  way	   social	   power,	   dominance,	   and	   inequality	   are	  
enacted,	  reproduced,	  and	  resisted	  by	  text	  and	  talk’	  (van	  Dijk	  2001:352)	  to	  the	  1980s,	  CDA	  underwent	  a	  
self-­‐reflective	   evolution	   beyond	   its	   focus	   on	   lexical	   questions.	   (Fairclough	   1995)	   Critical	   Discourse	  
Analysis	   now	   views	   itself	   as	   social	   action	   (Wodak	   2007);	   opposes	   social	   inequality	   (Van	   Dijk	   2001);	  
combines	   text	   immanent	   and	   social	   diagnostic	   criticism;	   promotes	   an	   equitable	   social	   order	   by	  
embracing	   a	   normative,	   universalist	   politics	   of	   ‘deliberative	   democracy’,	   a	   fully	   functioning	   ‘public	  
sphere’	   in	  Habermas’s	   sense	   (Reisigl	   and	  Wodak	   2001:34),	   and	   re-­‐contextualises	   oppressive	   language	  
use	  (Wodak	  and	  Fairclough	  2010).	  In	  these	  senses,	  CDA	  is	  an	  explicit	  linguistic	  expression	  of	  an	  attitude	  
that	  is	  all-­‐pervasive	  in	  Western	  interpretive	  thinking,	  the	  disposition	  of	  political	  critique.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  In	  contrast,	   in	  China,	   from	  Confucius’s	   invitation	  of	   the	  class	   to	  beat	  up	   the	  student	  who	  disagrees	  
with	  him	  (Analects	  Book	  11,	  16),	  even	  if	  this	  incident	  is	  to	  be	  read	  no	  more	  than	  as	  a	  metaphor,	  to	  the	  
‘rectification	   of	   names’	   in	   the	   work	   of	   Xunzi	   and	   beyond,	   Chinese	   classical	   thinking	   has	   been	  
dominated	   by	   two	   principles	   diametrically	   opposed	   to	   post-­‐Enlightenment	   thinking:	   the	   Confucian	  
meta-­‐rule	  of	  obedience	  and	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  role	  of	   language	  that	  one	  could	  sum	  up	  by	  the	  term	  
normative	  nominalism,	  emphasizing	  moral	  prescription	  and	  social	  particulars.	  Accordingly,	   the	  use	  of	  
language	   is	   neither	   determined	   by	   logical	   and	   syntactic	   relations	   nor	   by	   the	   relations	   between	  
sentences	  and	  the	  objects	  of	   the	  world,	  nor	  by	   its	  abstractive	  potential,	  but	  rather	  by	  the	  normative	  
rules	  emphasizing	  the	  specificity	  of	  titles,	  names	  and	  rank	  (ming),	  appropriate	  conduct	  (li)	  informed	  by	  
moral	  principle	  (de).	  As	  a	  result,	  both	  the	  meta-­‐rule	  of	  obedience	  and	  normative	  nominalism	  powerfully	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reinforce	   social	   order	   and	   political	   authority.	   Since	   Confucius	   this	   has	   been	   a	   rarely	   disputed	   belief	  
system	   which	   is	   effective	   to	   this	   day	   and	   still	   throws	   a	   retarding	   shadow	   on	   the	   introduction	   of	  
Western	  notions	  of	  critique,	  especially	  as	  exercised	  by	  individuals.	  Having	  said	  this,	  neither	  Confucian	  
obedience	  nor	  normative	  nominalism	  must	  be	  understood	  in	  any	  ‘timeless’	  sense.	  The	  umbrella	  notion	  
of	   Confucian	   obedience	   does	   not	   deny	   the	   fine-­‐grain	   differentiation	   of	   the	   many	   forms	   that	  
Confucianism	  has	  undergone	  throughout	  Chinese	  history,	  as	   forcefully	  argued	  for	  example	  by	  Joseph	  
Levenson	   (1968).	   Rather,	   the	   summary	  phrase	   is	  meant	   to	   capture	   a	   fundamental	   principle	   that	  has	  
survived,	   in	   ever	   changing	   historical	   guise,	   since	   its	   early	   formulations	   in	   the	   Analects.	   As	   such,	  
Confucian	   obedience	   is	   to	   be	   seen	   as	   a	   distillation	   into	   a	   meta-­‐rule	   of	   all	   the	   prescriptions	   and	  
prohibitions	   that	   characterize	   historical	  Confucianism.	  Much	   the	   same	   can	   be	   said	   about	   normative	  
nominalism.	  As	   Levenson	  himself	   in	   the	  end	   feels	   compelled	   to	  observe,	   in	   spite	  of	   all	   the	  historical	  
modifications	  of	  Confucian	  thought	   ‘the	  broad	  conditions	  …	  have	  been	   laid	  down’,	  such	  that	   ‘China’s	  
past	  will	  be	  kept	   in	  mind’	  and	  ‘fragments	  from	  its	  world	  of	  values	  valued’.	   (Levenson	  1968:	  122f.)	  To	  
that	  extent,	  the	  contemporary	  Chinese	  political	  unconscious	  still	  reflects	  political	  obedience	  as	  a	  value	  
and	  views	  Western	  critique	  with	  suspicion.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  when	  we	  compare	  traditional	  and	  more	  recent	  Chinese	  notions	  of	  criticism	  (pipan,	  
piping,	   lunheng,	   ziwo	   piping,	   da	   pipan,	   da	   ming,	   da	   fang,	   da	   bianlun)	   with	   their	   European,	   post-­‐
Enlightenment	  counterparts,	  we	  note	  a	  reversal	  of	  directionality.	  In	  the	  former,	  we	  are	  dealing	  with	  a	  
top-­‐down	  procedure,	  criticism	  by	  authority	  of	  subordinates;	  in	  the	  latter	  the	  reverse	  is	  the	  case.	  Since	  
“everything	  must	  submit	  to	  critique,”	  we	  have	  a	  bottom-­‐up	  directionality,	  from	  individuals	  and	  groups	  
questioning	   authority.	   Nor	   has	   that	   aspect	   of	   Confucian	   teaching	   been	   drastically	   altered	   under	  
consecutive	  communist	  Chinese	  regimes	  in	  spite	  of	  the	  temporary	  demotion	  of	  Confucius	  under	  Mao.	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Quite	  the	  contrary.	  In	  its	  revamping	  of	  Confucian	  values,	  the	  present	  Chinese	  government,	  like	  all	  of	  its	  
dynastic	  forerunners,	  is	  more	  than	  happy	  to	  perpetuate	  the	  Confucian	  meta-­‐rule	  of	  political	  obedience.	  	  
	  
	  	  	  Why,	  then,	  is	  China’s	  attempt	  to	  make	  its	  soft	  power	  campaign	  more	  effective	  a	  ‘mission	  impossible’?	  
In	  Sun’s	  analysis,	  the	  failure	  of	  the	  ‘Chinese	  party-­‐state	  and	  its	  media	  to	  present	  a	  convincing	  picture	  of	  
openness,	   transparency,	  and	  objective	  media	  outlook	   in	  a	  sustained	  and	  systemic	  way’	   is	   the	  result	  of	  
China’s	   ‘inability	   to	  adopt	  a	  set	  of	   institutionally-­‐sanctioned	  news	  values	  and	  news-­‐gathering	  practices	  
which	   are	   truly	   independent	   of	   political	   and	   ideological	   control	   and	   constraints’.	   (Sun	   2010:	   67f.)	  
According	   to	  Chin-­‐Hao	  Huang	   (2013),	   the	   failure	  of	   Chinese	   soft	   power	   in	  Asia	   is	   the	   result	   of	   Beijing	  
resorting	   to	   military	   coercion	   in	   the	   resolution	   of	   territorial	   disputes	   and	   China’s	   refusal	   to	   political	  
reform.	  What	   I	  want	   to	  add	  here	   is	   that	   the	   failure	   is	  not	  entirely	  China’s.	  Both	  Chinese	  and	  Western	  
media	  producers	  and	  audiences	  are	  captives	  of	  their	  respective	  political	  and	  cultural	  frames	  of	  reference,	  
a	  relation	  that	  is	  not	  exhausted	  by	  two	  deeply	  different	  histories	  of	  ideas,	  but	  must	  include	  also	  the	  logic	  
of	  transnational	  politics	  which	  powerfully	  intervenes	  in	  cross-­‐cultural	  media	  consumption.	  
Conclusion	  
Given	  these	  complications	  in	  the	  process	  of	  the	  cross-­‐cultural	  reception	  of	  media	  products,	  it	  should	  not	  
come	  as	  a	  surprise	  that	  the	  interpretive	  ‘horizons	  of	  expectations’	  characteristic	  of	  Western	  and	  Chinese	  
audiences	  should	  be	  different	  and,	  for	  the	  time	  being,	  incommensurate.	  	  This	  situation,	  however,	  cannot	  
be	  viewed	  from	  the	  West	  as	  a	  failure	  to	  be	  laid	  solely	  at	  the	  doorstep	  of	  China.	  It	  has	  partly	  also	  to	  do	  
with	   a	   Western	   fear	   of	   a	   rising	   China	   beneath	   which	   one	   can	   discover	   ‘a	   deeper	   set	   of	   questions	  
concerning	   identity’.	   For	   if	   part	   of	   that	   fear	   has	   to	   do	   with	   the	   perception	   of	   China’s	   expansive	  
nationalism,	  we	  must	   also	   realize	   that	   it	   is	   ‘easier	   to	   recognize	   nationalism	   in	   others	   than	   in	   oneself’	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(Barr	  2011:	  3).	  It	  would	  seem,	  as	  Michael	  Barr	  has	  remarked,	  that	  this	  fear	  is	  an	  expression	  of	  the	  West	  
facing	  ‘a	  loss	  of	  centrality’	  which	  amounts	  to	  nothing	  less	  than	  a	  serious	  ‘identity	  crisis’.	  (Barr	  2011:	  3;	  6)	  
To	  recognize	  this	  situation	  should	  not	  be	  beyond	  the	  West’s	  capacity	  not	  only	   for	  critique	  but	  also	  for	  
auto-­‐critique,	   systemic	   self-­‐criticism.	   After	   all,	   ‘the	   conditions	   and	   boundaries	   of	   audiencehood	   are	  
inherently	  unstable’.	  (Moores	  1995:	  2)	  Or,	  if	  the	  West,	  as	  Adorno	  and	  Horkheimer	  have	  argued,	  has	  lost	  
its	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐criticism	  as	  a	  result	  of	  mass	  media	  deception,	  then	  a	  serious	  examination	  of	  its	  fear	  
of	   China	  may	   very	  well	   revive	   that	   capacity.	   (Adorno	   and	   Horkheimer	   1972:	   120-­‐167)	   For	   only	  when	  
Western	  fears	  of	  a	  rising	  China	  are	  transformed	  into	  a	  self-­‐critical	  reassessment	  of	  its	  own	  cultural	  and	  
political	  presuppositions,	  can	  a	  more	  constructive	  cross-­‐cultural	  pattern	  of	  media	  consumption	  evolve.	  
Only	   then	   can	   the	   current	   politics	   of	   reception	   as	   cross-­‐cultural	   incompatibility	   be	   superseded	   by	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